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Abstract 
Using the Cambodia Socioeconomic Survey 2004 and employing micro-static simulation 
techniques, we measure the potential impacts of cash transfer programs for children to 
identify targeted groups that will have the most effect on poverty and school attendance. We 
conclude that the largest impacts occur by targeting poor children. If this proves to be too 
administratively costly, then targeting children in rural areas or targeting all children living in 
the ten poorest provinces will also yield significant poverty reduction. With regard to 
improving school attendance, the same targeted groups generally provide the biggest impacts 
as well, though the impacts on school attendance tend to be smaller than on poverty reduction.  
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Introduction 
An emerging consensus suggests that cash transfer programs are an important policy 
component for reducing poverty and vulnerability among people, and particularly among 
children, in developing countries. Numerous forms of cash transfer programs for children now 
exist in many countries. These programs have grown in prominence on the global policy 
agenda. Cash transfers can potentially help to fulfill basic human needs such as nutrition, 
health, shelter, education, and access to social services. They are also recognized as a way to 
promote household productivity, generate more income, and improve the living standards and 
welfare of all household members.  
In developing countries, cash transfers targeting children are of utmost importance, 
since children are a particularly impoverished and vulnerable group. For income poverty 
indicators, the findings of UNICEF (2000) indicate that children make up the majority of the 
poor and their risk of poverty is very high. In terms of other non-income indicators, a study by 
Gordon et al. (2003), which deploys household survey data from 46 developing countries, 
finds that one in two children suffer from severe deprivation in at least one dimension, and 
one in three children suffer from two or more forms of severe deprivation. A number of 
studies also show that poverty incidence among children is rather high compared to the 
population as a whole (Deaton and Paxson 1997; Lanjouw et al. 1998). Moreover, the 
presence of children tends to be correlated with chronic and persistent poverty for households, 
and children are important players in breaking the vicious inter-generational transmission of 
poverty. Poverty reduction policies targeting children thus should be a priority.  
As with other developing countries, poverty haunts the people of Cambodia, though 
poverty has been decreasing over time. The World Bank (2006a) shows that between 1993 
and 2004, the poverty rate was reduced to 35 percent from an estimated 47 percent, as the 
economy grew at an average rate of 7 percent. Both income and non-income indicators have 
demonstrated the improving living standards of the people. However, the poor, particularly 
the extreme poor, obtain a small share of these gains. While the poverty rate in the Capital and 
other urban areas fell by 60 percent and 44 percent, respectively, over this one decade, it fell 
by only 22 percent in the rural areas, where about 90 percent of the population and the 
majority of the poor reside. As well, poor people in Cambodia tend to have more children than 
the non-poor, as a woman in the poorest quintile aged 15-49 has on average 2.6 children, 
while a woman in the richest quintile has 1.5 children (World Bank 2006a). This implies that 
a disproportionate share of children reside in poor households.  
For Cambodia, the estimates of relative vulnerability among different groups by World 
Bank (2006b) indicate that children are a particularly vulnerable group. Comparing the 2000 
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Demographic and Health Survey and 2004 Cambodia Socio-economic Survey data, there has 
been no improvement in malnutrition rates, and these rates are much higher than those in 
other low income countries in the region (World Bank 2006a). Child mortality increased from 
115 in 1990 to 141 per 1,000 live births in 2004, which is among the highest in the world 
(UNICEF 2006). Despite marked progress in primary school enrolment rates, the dropout rate 
before completion remains a challenge. It is difficult to prevent children from dropping out of 
school before completing the primary level and even more difficult to keep them attending at 
the secondary level. The main potential factors explaining this high dropout rate and low 
completion rate are household’s resource constraints, lack of transfers and financial services 
(Wang and Moll 2010), and the importance for children to contribute to the livelihood of their 
households. Seeing the challenges of unequal distribution of benefits between the poor and the 
non-poor and the particular vulnerability of the poor as well as their children, it is important 
and urgent for policies to be designed to target them. Cash transfers can potentially provide a 
good policy option in this context, and this is the issue we seek to consider.  
In this regard, existing studies on cash transfer programs are broadly divided into two 
complementary approaches, ex-post analysis and ex-ante analysis. Ex-post analysis aims at 
evaluating the actual impacts of cash transfer programs already implemented, while ex-ante 
analysis aims at estimating, as best as possible, the appropriate program parameters and 
design for countries considering the adoption or modification of a cash transfer program. 
Using ex-post evaluation, existing studies generally find a positive impact of programs on 
child poverty and school attendance (as summarized by Fiszbein et al. 2009). Focusing on the 
ex-ante approach that will be used in this study, Kakwani et al. (2006) and UNICEF (2009) 
study the potential impact of cash transfer programs on poverty for African countries and find 
a potential for them to reduce poverty for children and the whole population. Kakwani et al. 
(2006) also show that cash transfer programs can positively affect child education, though the 
impact is small without incorporating conditions for receipt. Bourguignon et al. (2003) 
simulate the Bolsa Escola in Brazil and show that its impact on school attendance is large but 
is muted on the poverty rate. Son and Florentino (2008), who apply a similar approach for the 
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino in the Philippines, show that this cash transfer program can 
increase school attendance and decrease poverty, with particularly large impacts when 
targeting poor households. 
Inarguably, the success of cash transfer programs in some countries does not guarantee 
that they will be similarly successful in other countries, as countries may have different and 
unique characteristics. Those successes can only be examples and guides for practice and 
caution. Before applying the program, ex-ante analysis is important in designing suitable 
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parameters and assessing the potential impacts of those designed program so that policy 
makers can identify the most effective program for implementation.  
In Cambodia, there has not been any ex-ante research conducted so far to explore 
various cash transfer designs and to see their potential impacts on poverty rates and child 
education. This matter is crucial when we want to find the most effective programs given a 
limited government budget. Therefore, this paper aims to contribute in this area, providing the 
first approximation of simulated impacts of cash transfer programs with various schemes and 
targeted groups on poverty and school attendance in Cambodia, which are two of the 
prioritized areas of the Cambodian Millennium Development Goals.  
 
Data and Methodology 
Data 
We use the Cambodian Socio-Economic Survey 2004 (CSES 2004) which is 
conducted by the National Institute of Statistics, Cambodia, with technical support from 
Statistics Sweden and the World Bank. The survey was designed to provide information about 
the social and economic conditions of households in Cambodia. It contains 15,000 
representative households with 74,719 individuals. Unless otherwise noted, our calculations 
will use sample weights to make the data representative for the entire population in Cambodia.  
The survey is conducted at the household level, but it also contains some 
characteristics for individuals, including age, gender, relationship to household head, marital 
status, working status, wages, health status, and educational attainment. At the household 
level, the survey provides information about sources of household income, household 
expenditure, business and agricultural activities, ownership of consumer durables, wealth, and 
housing conditions. The information about sources of income and expenditure being available 
only at the household level does limit our ability to provide detailed analysis of intra-
household sharing. For example, we are unable to identify how the income and the 
expenditures are actually divided among the family members.  
 
Methodology 
We aim to meet two objectives in our paper. First, we apply micro-static simulation 
techniques with the CSES 2004 data to quantify the potential impact of cash transfers 
provided to various groups on poverty rates among school-age children and poverty rates for 
the total population. We simulate different scenarios and alternatives to look for the most 
effective scheme and targeted group in terms of poverty reduction and welfare improvement, 
given different fixed budget levels. Second, we apply a probit model to estimate the 
determinants of school attendance for children aged between 6 and 17 years old. We will 
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estimate these determinants for different groups, particularly seeking to know the marginal 
effect of household income on the household’s decision for child education after controlling 
for underlying factors. From these estimates, we simulate how cash transfer programs 
provided to each targeted group will impact school attendance as measured by the percentage 
increase in the estimated school attendance rate after the cash transfer program is in place. For 
the ex-ante approach where there is not an actual program to be evaluated, the potential 
program impact on school attendance is evaluated on the basis of a household model. 
Examples of this approach on school attendance can be seen in Bourguignon et al. (2003) and 
Kakwani et al. (2006). In contrast, for ex-post impact evaluation when a program exists, the 
actual impact of the program intervention can be evaluated. This is accomplished by 
comparing the outcomes for the benefit recipients to non-recipients, after controlling for 
selection issues if truly random samples are not available. The selection is done to ensure that 
the two groups share similar characteristics. This approach can be found in studies of 
conditional cash transfer programs (for example, see Attanasio et al. 2005; de Brauw and 
Hoddinott 2010; Schultz 2004). 
 
Poverty Incidence Measurement 
The analysis will focus on three aspects of poverty: poverty incidence as measured by 
the poverty headcount ratio, poverty depth as measured by the poverty gap index, and poverty 
severity as measured by the poverty severity index. These three poverty measures are widely 
known as Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) poverty measures. The poverty headcount ratio 
represents the percentage of the population whose per-capita household expenditures are 
below the official poverty line. The poverty gap index represents how far, on average, a poor 
person falls below the poverty line, proportionally. The poverty severity index, measured by 
the mean of squared proportionate poverty gaps, puts more weight on extreme poverty.  
Official poverty lines in Cambodia in 2004 are divided regionally into Phnom Penh, 
other urban areas, and rural areas. They are obtained by applying inflation adjustments to the 
base poverty line from 1993/1994. The base-year poverty line is a combination of the food 
poverty line, which was calculated from the cost of a 155-food-item basket just sufficient to 
meet a minimum food requirement of 2100 calories per person per day, and a non-food 
allowance, which was defined as the estimated value of non-food consumption for the people 
whose per capita household consumption per day was just at the food poverty line. The cost of 
food and non-food consumption was estimated separately for the three regions to obtain three 
regional base-year poverty lines. To get the 2004 poverty lines, both the base-year food 
poverty line and non-food allowance in each region was updated with price indices to adjust 
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for inflation. The 2004 poverty lines are KHR 2,351, KHR 1,952, and KHR 1,753 per day in 
Phnom Penh, other urban areas, and rural areas, respectively.  
To measure poverty rates, we will consider two measures of household expenditure, 
the officially-used per capita expenditure and an adult equivalent expenditure. The adult 
equivalent concept has now become widely used in many empirical studies. As indicated by 
Deaton (1997), measuring poverty with per capita expenditure, which is calculated by 
dividing household expenditure by the number of household members, assumes that everyone 
in household is the same, having the same needs and enjoying the same amount of 
consumption. An adult equivalent scale takes into consideration that children spend less than 
adults and also that due to economies of scale, a large household can reduce total expenditures 
by living together and sharing household goods. Following Banks and Johnson (1994) and 
Deaton and Paxson (1997), adult equivalent expenditure is defined as:  
 )*( ChildrenAdults
nditureehold ExpeTotal Housenditurevalent ExpAdult Equi       (1) 
where Adults and Children represent their respective numbers in the household, and α and θ 
lie between zero and one. α shows the fraction of adult spending required by children, while θ 
accounts for the economies of scale. When 1  and  1   , the adult equivalent will be the 
per capita expenditure. For an alternative, we use 75.0  and  5.0   , following Giang and 
Pfau (2009).   
 
Targeted Groups 
This paper considers the following targeted groups of beneficiaries:  
(1) All school-age children: This is the universal targeting program that provides a cash 
transfer to every child between 6 and 17 years old.  
(2) School-age children in the rural areas. 
(3) Poor school-age children, which includes any school-age child residing in a household 
with per capita expenditures below the official poverty line. 
(4) School-age children living in the 10 poorest provinces in Cambodia, namely Banteay 
Meanchey, Kampong Speu, Kampong Thum, Krong Kaeb, Mondul Kiri, Preah Vihear, 
Ratanakiri, Siem Reab, Steung Traeng, and Svay Reang. 
(5) School-age children living in a widowed parent household. 
(6) School-age children living in the 10 provinces with the lowest school attendance rate 
in Cambodia, namely Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thum, Kaoh 
Kong, Krong Kaeb, Mondul Kiri, Preah Vihear, Rattanak Kiri, Siem Reab, and Stueng 
Traing. 
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Simulating the Impact of Cash Transfers on Poverty 
We will estimate how the poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap and poverty severity  
indices of school-age children and the whole population would have changed, in percentage 
terms, if a cash transfer scheme had been introduced in the past in Cambodia. A higher 
percentage reduction of poverty is considered to be more effective and thus desirable. We will 
also compute the leakage rate of benefits to see how much of the benefit would go to the non-
poor.  
We assume that the benefits for children will contribute to the household’s total 
expenditures and then be distributed equally among the household members. This assumption 
is needed because of the survey limitation that we can not identify the actual expenditures of 
each household member. Furthermore, with ex-ante simulation, we assume that the behaviors 
among population would not be changed in ways to be qualified for benefits or to substitute 
benefits for income-generating activities.  The results will show only the direct and immediate 
effect on poverty rates if the cash transfer program existed in 2004, and they do not 
incorporate any potential indirect or long-term impacts, such as improved health status, 
enhanced household productivity, the so-called multiplier effect on local economy, and 
reduced child labor as mentioned by UNICEF (2009). 
 
Simulating the Impact on School Attendance  
Before being able to simulate the impact of cash transfers on school attendance, we 
need to assess the schooling determinants from the model of household demand for schooling, 
with a particular interest in knowing the role of household expenditures. Household 
expenditures are widely used to proxy family permanent income as expenditures are well 
represented in household survey data for developing countries (for example, see Chaudhuri 
2009; Kanji 2011). We will limit our study to demand factors for education, excluding supply 
factors, since there is no readily available information about the supply of schooling from the 
survey. For example, we do not know how many schools are in a village or a district, or how 
long it takes for children to reach school, etc. Also, similar to Kakwani et al. (2006), we will 
not incorporate the children’s labor market characteristics, since we do not have enough 
information from the survey about the children’s work, such as whether or not children study 
and work at the same time and how much income they earn.  
To study the determinants of school attendance, we estimate a probit regression model 
separately by gender and poverty status to assess whether the determinants are different for 
these various groups. Following Kakwani et al.  (2006), we derive a reduced formed equation 
from the maximization of the household’s utility function subject to the expenditure 
constraints as follows:  
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where ei  is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution. We observe yi, rather than the 
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The probit model is 
))ln(()()1Pr(  iiiii PCEHHHeadChildXXy      (3) 
where  is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. With the estimated probit 
equation, the marginal effects of each explanatory variable on schooling can then be 
calculated. 
(.)
The reduced form equation for children’s school attendance is derived as a function of 
a set of vectors describing child characteristics, characteristics of the household head, and 
characteristics of household itself, in addition to per-capita household expenditure. The vector 
of child characteristics )( iChild  consists of gender, age and age squared, and whether the 
child is an offspring or a grandchild of the head. The vector of characteristics of household 
head )( iHead contains gender, age and age squared, highest educational attainment, and 
occupational sector of the head. The vector of household characteristics )( iHH  includes 
sector (urban or rural) and the age distribution of household members by group (0-5, 6-17, and 
18 onwards). Finally, the main variable of interest is the logarithm of per capita expenditure, 
as it is what will be affected by a cash transfer. 
We will estimate the coefficients of this probit model, and for various targeted groups, 
we will simulate how cash transfer programs targeting those groups affect the probability of 
school attendance for each recipient with the equation: 
)ˆ)ln(ˆˆˆ()ˆ)ln(ˆˆˆ(ˆ  iiiiiiiiii PCEHHHeadChildCTPCEHHHeadChildP        (4) 
Where  is the amount of the transfer provided to child i. From the estimated increase in 
probability of school attendance, we can estimate the number of children starting to attend 
school after the program:  
iCT
 
i
ii Pweight )ˆ*(                                      (5) 
Where  is the sample weight given to child i. Eventually, we can divide the additional 
number of school attendees after the program by the total number of current school attendees 
to obtain the percentage increase in school attendance.       
iweight
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Results       
Overview of Poverty and School Attendance of Children in Cambodia  
The poverty rate for school-age children was 41.08 percent, and 76.44 percent of 
school-age children were attending school. Figures 1 provides the estimates of poverty and 
school attendance in 2004 for school-age children by age and by province, and Table 1 
classifies these rates by gender, sector, geographical regions, type of family, poverty and 
schooling status.  
// Figure 1 About Here // 
Figure 1 shows that poverty rates exhibited a decreasing trend by age, ranging from 
44.6 percent to 35.4 percent. Younger children were more likely to live in poverty. The school 
attendance rates, on the other hand, display an inverse U-shaped pattern, rising continuously 
from 47 percent for 6-year-old children to the peak at 93 percent for 11-year-old children and 
then falling steadily afterward. The first half of the inverse U-shaped pattern interestingly 
implies a late start for school attendance. In Cambodia, children whose age is 6 are entitled to 
register and start schooling. However, less than 50 percent of this age group was actually 
attending school. School attendance rates suddenly jumped for children at age 7 and age 8. 
The latter half of the pattern indicates a continual decrease in school attendance rates for 
higher age groups. Among 17-year-olds, less than half were attending school, perhaps because 
of higher opportunity costs for older children to stay in school. 
// Table 1 About Here // 
Between male and female school-age children, Table 1 shows no statistical difference 
in poverty rates, but school attendance rates for female children were around 4 percentage 
points lower. For family type as well, poverty rates among the subgroups were not 
significantly different, while school attendance rates did show a rather big difference as 
children living with a single or widowed parent were less likely to attend school.  
For rural and urban areas, there is a big gap in poverty and school attendance rates. 
The poverty headcount ratio in urban areas was approximately 21 percent, whereas in the rural 
areas, where more than 85 percent of the children resided, it was around 44 percent. More 
than 90 percent of poor children lived in the rural areas, and the school attendance rate in the 
rural areas was about 8 percentage points lower than in urban areas.   
Geographically stratified, the plateau areas have the highest poverty incidence (at 58 
percent) and the lowest school attendance rates (at 70 percent), followed by Tonle Sap. These 
two regions were home to more than 40 percent of children. Among the five regions, the 
lowest poverty incidence (at less than 7 percent) and the highest school attendance rate (at 
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more than 87 percent) are found in the capital city, Phnom Penh, where less than 7 percent of 
children resided. Figure 1 also categorizes poverty and school attendance rates by provinces, 
ranked in descending order by school attendance rates. We find that provinces with high 
school attendance rates generally had low poverty rates. As well, 7 out of 10 provinces which 
had the lowest school attendance rates were also classified as part of the 10 poorest provinces 
in terms of child poverty.  
Table 1 also shows a large gap for school attendance between poor and non-poor 
children. Less than 70 percent of the poor children and more than 80 percent of the non-poor 
children were attending school. The poverty rate among children who were not attending 
school was 53 percent, which is considerably higher than for those who were attending (37 
percent). This might suggest that some children were not attending school because their 
families could not afford their education, though the direct cost of education in Cambodia is 
free throughout the 12-year education. The relationship between family incomes and 
expenditures on child education is discussed further in Mauldin and Mimura (2001). 
 
Simulating the Impact of a Cash Transfer Program on Poverty Rates 
This section provides the simulated results for the impact of cash transfer programs on 
poverty. First, Table 2 surveys the potential impact of cash transfer programs provided to each 
targeted group. It shows how a benefit level of 50 percent of the official poverty line provided 
to all eligible school-age children aged 6 to 17 affects the poverty rates of direct recipients, all 
school-age children, and the total population, respectively. These estimated results are not 
directly comparable, since the costs and number of recipients differ between each targeted 
group as shown in the table. Subsequent tables will correct for this initial deficiency.  
// Table 2 About Here // 
From Table 2, we see that the estimated total benefits paid would vary from KHR 
124.2 Billion (0.58 percent of GDP in 2004) when the program was targeted to children living 
with a widowed parent, to KHR 1,258.7 Billion (5.87 percent of GDP in 2004) when the 
program was provided universally. The estimates show that in every targeted group, the 
benefit spent by direct recipients would be less than half of the estimated benefit paid, 
suggesting a high leakage rate in all proposed programs. This result, again, relates to the 
assumption that the benefit would be pooled within the household and then distributed equally 
among all members in the household. Evidence for the leakage of benefits to non-recipients is 
also found in studies of existing programs (see for example Chaudhuri 2009; Ploeg 2009).  
The results also show the size of the potential poverty reduction (poverty headcount 
ratio, poverty gap index, and poverty severity index) among direct recipients, all school-age 
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children, and the total population. A 50 percent benefit would generate a more than 30 percent 
decrease in the poverty headcount ratio, a more than 45 percent decrease in the poverty gap 
index, and a more than 55 percent decrease in the poverty severity index among direct 
recipients, though the impact size varies across targeted groups. In terms of poverty among all 
school-age children, the decrease in the poverty headcount ratio would range from 4.16 
percent when children living with a widowed parent were targeted, to 39.62 percent when 
poor children or all children were targeted. Also, in terms of poverty among the total 
population, the decrease in the poverty headcount ratio would range from 2.96 percent when 
targeting children living with a widowed parent to 31.5 percent when targeting poor or all 
children. The low magnitude of the impact for some targeted groups is largely resulting from 
the fewer recipients and lower total cost.  
Following Giang and Pfau (2009), the bottom part of Table 2 shows the poverty 
reduction efficiency for different targeted groups, which is defined as the proportion of total 
benefits paid that goes toward reducing the poverty gap. Naturally, among various targeted 
groups, targeting the poor group would produce the highest effectiveness in poverty reduction, 
followed by targeting the group of children in the 10 poorest provinces. The poverty reduction 
efficiency for the poor group is 35.6 percent for direct recipients and school-age children and 
79.59 percent for total population, meaning that 35.6 percent of benefits contribute to 
reducing child poverty and 79.59 percent of benefits contribute to reducing total poverty. 
// Figure 2 About Here // 
Figures 2 and 3 extend the analysis in Table 2 by varying the benefit levels and ending 
eligibility ages for the poor group. In Figure 2, we vary the benefit level up to 200 percent of 
the poverty line and fix the ending eligible age at 17. The top panel shows that the cost of 
benefits paid proportionately increases with the benefit level. Looking at the poverty reduction 
efficiency, we can see a roughly linear decreasing trend, indicating that the effectiveness in 
reducing poverty would decrease mainly proportionately as the benefit level increases. In 
other words, a larger proportion of benefits leaks to the non-poor as the benefit level increases 
and the previously poor people are increasingly pushed out of poverty. The bottom panel 
shows the decrease in the poverty headcount ratio and poverty gap index among school-age 
children and the total population. Both poverty measures decrease as benefits grow, but at a 
decreasing rate. In other words, the marginal reduction in poverty would diminish as benefits 
grow, providing an interesting implication that considerable poverty reduction can be 
achieved even with relatively small benefit levels. In Figure 3, meanwhile, we fix the benefit 
level to 50 percent while varying the ending eligible age from 6 to 17 years old. The top panel 
of Figure 3 illustrates an increase in total benefits paid and a relatively small decrease in 
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poverty reduction efficiency as the ending eligible age increases. From the lower panel, we 
can see that as the ending eligible age increases, poverty rates would mainly decrease linearly, 
implying that there would not be a big difference in marginal poverty reduction over different 
ending eligible ages.   
// Figure 3 About Here // 
Next, we attempt to determine the appropriate targeted group and program parameters 
when the cash transfer program budget is limited to 1 percent of GDP in 2004. This allows for 
a more direct comparison among programs with varying targeted groups, eligible ages, and 
benefit levels. This information is provided in Table 3, and the poverty estimates use official 
per-capita expenditure and official poverty lines.  
// Table 3 About Here // 
Table 3 considers programs costing approximately 1 percent of GDP. The findings in 
Table 3 suggest that providing cash transfers to poor school-age children would produce the 
best poverty reduction result. Among the listed options, providing a cash transfer amounting 
to 26 percent of the poverty line to all poor children aged 6 to 15 would achieve the highest 
reduction of poverty for all three measures for both children and the total population. As well, 
this scheme would produce the biggest impact for social welfare. This program would result 
in a reduction in the poverty headcount ratio among children and the total population of 18 
percent and 14 percent, respectively, while the poverty gap and poverty severity indices would 
decrease by around 31 percent and 40 percent, respectively, among children, and around 25 
percent and 33 percent, respectively, among the total population.  
However, there are high administrative costs and hurdles to overcome when targeting 
poor children, since it is generally hard to identify the poor.  Also, in a developing country 
like Cambodia, which has not had a good governance system, a big bias in identifying the 
poor is likely to be inevitable. Thus, this cost and benefit of directly targeting the poor group 
has to be cautiously considered. If it is too hard and costly to identify and target the poor 
group directly, we can consider the other six targeted groups. Among these, targeting those in 
rural areas would provide the most effective reduction in the poverty headcount ratio. A cash 
transfer benefit of 24 percent of the poverty line for each child aged 6 to 10 in the rural areas 
would reduce the poverty headcount ratio among children by 8.3 percent and among the total 
population by 6.6 percent. However, when we focus on the poverty gap and poverty severity, 
the results suggest that targeting all children living in the 10 poorest provinces would be the 
best choice. Providing each child aged 6 to 13 in the 10 poorest provinces with a benefit of 42 
percent would achieve the highest reduction in the poverty gap and poverty severity and the 
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largest increase in utility. As seen, the best groups to target depend on poverty measures that 
policy makers want to prioritize. 
Experiences in other countries also show a clear positive impact on poverty. Fiszbein 
et al. (2009) estimate the impacts of existing conditional cash transfer programs and find that 
these programs provide a significant reduction in national poverty rates. For example, in 
Ecuador, the reductions in the poverty gap and poverty severity indices are 14 percent and 19 
percent, respectively, for a per-capita expenditure transfer of 8.3 percent. The estimates for the 
reductions in poverty gap and severity indices in Jamaica are 9 and 13 percent, respectively, 
with a 10.7 percent transfer. In Mexico, the program’s impact is about 19 percent for the 
reduction in the poverty gap index and 29 percent for the poverty severity index, when a per-
capita expenditure transfer of 33.4 percent is provided.  
// Table 4 About Here // 
Next, Table 4 expands the results of Table 3 by including a wider range of total 
expenditure levels and both equivalence scales to check the robustness of the targeting group 
findings. We vary the total expenditure on the cash transfer programs from 0.25 percent to 1.5 
percent of GDP in 2004. To avoid showing too many details, we mention only the best 
outcomes for various measures. This corresponds to showing only the numbers and targeted 
groups that are in bold face in Table 3. 
In Table 4, when we use official per capita expenditures, the results show consistency 
and support to our earlier findings across expenditure levels. That is, under a limited budget, 
for various benefit expenditure levels, the poor group would be the best group to target. 
Leaving the poor group aside, we see the rural group often appears as the best targeted group 
to reduce the poverty headcount ratio, and the group of 10 poorest provinces always appears 
as the best group to reduce the poverty gap and poverty severity indices and also to increase 
the social welfare.  
As for the adult equivalence expenditure scale, one interesting finding from Table 4 is 
that apart from the poor group, the group of children in the 10 poorest provinces always 
appears as the best targeted group for optimal reduction of all various poverty measures 
including the poverty headcount ratio. Moreover, using the adult equivalent expenditure scale 
generally results in even larger poverty reductions than using the official per capita 
expenditure. These differences provide an important message for policy makers; that is, 
accuracy in poverty measurements plays a crucial role in providing proper direction for policy 
implementation and in evaluating the impacts of social programs. If households do enjoy 
economies of scale and if children require less expenditure than adults, then the official per 
capita expenditure scale may not provide the most meaningful results. 
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 Simulating the Impact of a Cash Transfer Program on School Attendance 
Determinants of School Attendance for School-age Children 
// Table 5 About Here // 
We first estimate the probit model for school-age children to study the factors that 
determine their school attendance. Table 5 presents variable definitions and summary 
statistics, and Table 6 presents the results in the form of marginal effects on school attendance 
for children aged 6 to 17 years. These results are provided for all children together, and for 
four subgroups including male non-poor children, female non-poor children, male poor 
children, and female poor children, as it is reasonable to expect that the determinants of school 
attendance may differ between these groups. Generally, male children enjoy greater 
opportunities to attend school, and poor children are more constrained financially and have a 
higher relative opportunity cost for attending school than non-poor children. Our decision to 
make these separations is also supported by a Chow Test, which reveals that these separations 
are appropriate at the 5 percent significance level. The separate estimation is also important 
when we simulate the impact of cash transfers on school attendance, as we are able to identify 
appropriate coefficients for each group, rather than assuming that each group shares the same 
coefficients and, thus, the same school determinants. 
// Table 6 About Here // 
From Table 6, all the variables explaining the child characteristics are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent significance level for all groups except the male poor group. Older 
children are less likely to attend school, but the offspring of the household head are more 
likely. In the overall regression, we also find that female children are less likely to attend 
school. Regarding the household head’s characteristics, most variables are not statistically 
significant in explaining children’s school attendance in Cambodia. Only the head’s education 
level has a consistent impact on school attendance for every group; this effect is positive, and 
it is larger for poor children. The variables explaining the household characteristics tend to be 
statistically significant more often than not. The estimates show that children in urban areas 
are more likely to attend school than children in the rural areas. Also, the number of other 
children in the household negatively affects the school attendance, whereas the number of 
adults in the household positively affects the school attendance. Lastly, the variable of our 
main interest, the logarithm of per capita expenditure, has a statistically significant impact for 
every group. Household expenditures do play an important role in determining children’s 
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school attendance. The size of the effect tends to be slightly larger for females, and the impact 
of expenditures is about 3 times bigger for poor children. 
Most Effective Group and Potential Impact on School Attendance 
// Table 7 About Here // 
Table 7 provides the estimates of the increase in school attendance rates after the 
introduction of various cash transfers for programs costing one percent of GDP. The impacts 
on school attendance are modest, accounting for a less than 1 percent increase in school 
attendance in all cases. This suggests that an unconditional cash transfer program cannot be 
expected to produce a large increase school attendance. The targeted group that would achieve 
the highest increase in school attendance is the poor group. In the best case, offering a benefit 
of 22 percent of the poverty line to poor children aged 6-17 would increase the school 
attendance rate by 0.77 percent. If we do not consider the poor group directly, then targeting 
the children in the 10 poorest provinces is recommended as the best targeted group to achieve 
the highest increase in school attendance. A benefit of 30 percent of the poverty line for 
children aged 6-17 in these provinces would increase school attendance by 0.49 percent. 
Comparing with existing conditional cash transfer programs in other countries, our 
estimates can be considered as the lower bounds of impacts if conditionality is to be 
incorporated in the actual program. For example, in Columbia, a study by Attanasio et al. 
(2005), uses propensity score matching and a differences-in-differences estimator to compare 
the outcomes of changes in enrolment rates in villages under the Familias en Accion program 
with comparison villages. They find that the program increases attendance rates for children 
aged 14-17 by about 5 percentage points in both rural and urban areas, while impacts for 
children aged 8-13 is 2.7 percent points in rural areas and not significant in urban areas. In 
Honduras, results from a randomized design program suggest that the demand side 
intervention of the Programa de Asignación Familiar increases school enrolment rates by 
about 1-2 percentage points. No impact is found with the supply side intervention (Glewwe 
and Olinto 2004). In Ecuador, the impact on school enrolment rates from the Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano program, a conditional cash transfer program for children aged 6-17, is 
approximately 10 percentage points, as estimated by Schady and Araujo (2008) using an 
instrumental variable estimator. Schultz (2004) uses randomized assignment to evaluate the 
impact of Mexico’s Progresa in rural areas and finds that the program helped increase school 
attendance rates by about 3 percentage points for children who completed grades 1 through 5. 
The impact is significant for grade 6 (11 percentage points) but not significant for grades 7 
through 9. These conditional cash transfer programs show positive impacts on school 
attendance, though the magnitude of the impacts is diverse among countries potentially 
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because of varying transfer amounts and baseline school enrolment rates. Conditionality may 
induce a higher impact on school attendance in Cambodia than we find with these estimates 
for an unconditional cash transfer program.  
// Table 8 About Here // 
In Table 8, we expand the results of Table 7 by including a wide range of expenditure 
levels and showing only the schemes producing the best results. The groups of poor children 
and children living in the 10 poorest provinces mostly appear as the best groups to achieve the 
maximum increase in school attendance. Moreover, over various expenditure levels, the most 
effective program to promote school attendance mostly occurs with the highest ending eligible 
age. This provides clear evidence that providing the cash transfer program to more children 
with a lower benefit would be a more desirable way to promote school attendance for a given 
program cost, and also that cash transfers will play a bigger role in boosting school attendance 
for older children. 
 
Conclusion 
In developing countries, economic growth is considered a main driver for poverty 
reduction. However, it is often the case that the benefits from growth are not shared evenly 
among people. Such unequal distribution puts pressure on equality within the society and 
further induces the vulnerability of the poor. In such a context, social assistance can play a 
crucial role in redistribution and poverty reduction. One prominent form of social assistance is 
a cash transfer program. Using the Cambodia Socio-economic Survey 2004, this paper 
employed a micro-static simulation technique to study and simulate the potential impacts of 
cash transfer programs for children on poverty rates and school attendance. We sought to 
determine the targeted group and program parameters that would provide the highest poverty 
reduction and school attendance promotion in Cambodia.  
The estimates suggest that there would be a considerable reduction of poverty rates 
among the children who are recipients of the cash transfer program, and the poverty reduction 
efficiency would be high if the program could directly target the poor group. Even with a 
limited budget, poverty rates can be reduced significantly if the poor group can be targeted 
directly, but it is generally administratively costly and hard to target the poor. Alternatively, to 
achieve lower administrative costs, targeting rural children or the children in the 10 poorest 
provinces would also have strong impacts on poverty measures. In terms of school attendance, 
our findings suggest a very modest outcome, implying that a voluntary increase in demand for 
school attendance without conditionality for the cash transfer would be small. This suggests 
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that conditions such as a requirement for school attendance should accompany the cash 
transfer program.   
We find that the simulation results for poverty and school attendance suggest the same 
targeted groups as the best groups. However, the level of benefits and age range to be offered 
are different. For poor children, providing 26 percent of the poverty line with an ending 
eligible age of 15 would achieve the highest poverty reduction, while providing a benefit of 
22 percent with an ending eligible age of 17 would achieve the highest increase in school 
attendance. This outcome also applies to the group of children in the 10 poorest provinces and 
some other targeted groups. While a benefit of 42 percent of the poverty line provided to 
children in the 10 poorest provinces with an ending eligible age of 13 would reduce the 
poverty gap and poverty severity the most, a benefit of 30 percent of the poverty line with an 
ending eligible age of 17 would increase school attendance the most. Policy makers should 
have a clear-cut priority when introducing a cash transfer program.  
As for other policy implications, firstly, with the diminishing marginal reduction of 
poverty, substantial poverty reduction can be achieved with a relatively small benefit level 
and relatively wide coverage group. Secondly, the accuracy of poverty measurements used is 
crucial in providing proper direction for policy implementation and in evaluating the impacts 
of social programs. Moreover, by looking at each targeted group, we find that for a given cost, 
the highest school attendance rate can be achieved through the combination of higher eligible 
ages and lower benefits. A policy implication follows that providing the cash transfer program 
to as many school-age children as possible will ensure the highest increase in school 
attendance, even though the benefit level is less.      
A number of issues in relation to child cash transfers, poverty reduction, and school 
enrolment can be addressed in future research. To the extent that these cash transfers will 
impact behavior, it is necessary to build further models to incorporate behavioral feedback 
from new policies. Managing these cash transfers at a reasonable level of administrative costs 
is important to consider.  White (2009) argues that undertaking adequate qualitative field 
work before moving to the quantitative analysis enables evaluators to better design ex-ante 
impact studies and do sensible quantitative analyses. Such additional analysis for subsequent 
research can help to determine potential behavioral responses, as well as to help determine 
appropriate conditions for benefit receipt. 
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Table 1 Poverty measures, school attendance rates, and demographic characteristics of school-age 
children,  2004 
Poverty among children Indicators  Proportion of 
children (%) 
Poverty 
headcount 
ratio (%) 
Poverty 
gap index 
(%) 
Poverty 
severity 
index (%) 
School 
attendance 
rate (%) 
All 100 41.08 11.24 4.33 76.44 
Sex          
  Male  51.15 41.03 11.25 4.33 78.28* 
  Female 48.85 41.13 11.22 4.34 74.52* 
Type of family          
  Both parents 81.70  40.86 11.14 4.29 77.62* 
  Single parent 11.70 43.55 12.45 4.92 70.20* 
  Widowed parent 9.46 42.94 12.56 5.06 68.89* 
Sector      
  Rural  85.70 44.48* 12.16 4.67 75.28* 
  Urban 14.30 20.72* 5.71 2.29 83.11* 
Regions          
  Phnom Penh 6.71 6.72* 1.79 0.82 87.65* 
  Plain 43.03 38.26* 9.33 3.34 78.06* 
  Tonle Sap 31.04 48.73* 14.53 5.88 73.49* 
  Coastal 8.33 32.44* 7.27 2.50 77.30* 
  Plateau/Mountain 10.88 58.20* 18.22 7.43 70.16* 
Poverty status      
 Poor  41.08 N/A N/A N/A 69.36* 
 Non-poor 58.92 N/A N/A N/A 81.38* 
Schooling       
 Attending 76.94 37.33* 9.70 3.60 N/A 
 Not attending 23.06 53.58* 16.37 6.78 N/A 
Source: Authors’ calculations using CSES 2004 
Notes:  *  significant differences among subgroup categories at 5 percent level   
 
 
Table 2 Estimated impacts on different targeted groups for a cash transfer benefit equal to 50 percent of the official poverty line 
Indicators ALL RUR FEM POO PRO WID LOW 
Total benefit paid (KHR billion) 1258.7 1052.4 662.9 485.6 364.1 124.2 432.5 
 (as per cent of GDP) 5.87 4.91 3.09 2.27 1.70 0.58 2.02 
 % spent by recipients 43.97 44.40 30.81 45.57 44.20 47.08 44.39 
 % spent by school-age children 43.97 44.40 45.01 45.57 44.20 48.72 44.39 
 % spent by non-school-age children 56.03 55.60 54.99 54.43 55.80 51.28 55.61 
Direct recipients        
 Change in poverty headcount ratio (%) -39.62 -39.51 -31.30 -39.62 -30.98 -40.71 -33.5 
 Change in poverty gap index (%) -57.15 -57.31 -45.87 -57.15 -53.23 -58.88 -54.36 
 Change in poverty severity index (%) -67.49 -67.69 -55.92 -67.49 -65.4 -68.66 -65.77 
School-age children        
 Change in poverty headcount ratio (%) -39.62 -36.66 -22.85 -39.62 -12.11 -4.16 -14.16 
 Change in poverty gap index (%) -57.15 -52.72 -34.51 -57.15 -23.6 -6.43 -24.87 
 Change in poverty severity index (%) -67.49 -61.5 -43.09 -67.49 -30.74 -7.83 -31.15 
Total population        
 Change in poverty headcount ratio (%) -31.50 -29.15 -17.72 -31.50 -9.67 -2.96 -11.45 
 Change in poverty gap index (%) -47.40 -43.77 -27.54 -47.40 -19.81 -4.92 -20.81 
 Change in poverty severity index (%) -57.54 -52.49 -35.13 -57.54 -26.64 -6.31 -26.94 
Poverty reduction efficiency (percentage of total cost that reduces poverty gap) 
 Direct recipients -13.73 -15.16 -10.22 -35.60 -19.61 -15.10 -17.39 
 School-age children -13.73 -15.16 -15.75 -35.60 -19.61 -15.67 -17.39 
  Total population -30.7 -33.91 -33.87 -79.59 -44.36 -32.33 -39.23 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using CSES 2004 
Note: ‘ALL’:  All school-age children (or universal); ‘RUR’: School-age children living in rural areas; ‘FEM’: Female school-age 
children; ‘POO’: School-age children living in poor households; ‘PRO’:  school-age children living in the 10 poorest provinces; ‘WID’: 
School-age children living with a widowed parent; and ‘LOW’: School-age children living in the 10 provinces with the lowest school 
attendance rate 
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Table 3 Selection of cash transfer programs costing approximately 1 percent of GDP in 2004 (KHR 214.833 million or USD 53.32 million) 
Category Ending 
eligible 
age 
Benefit 
level 
as % of 
poverty 
line 
Change in 
poverty 
headcount 
ratio for 
children 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
headcount 
ratio for 
population 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
gap index 
for 
children 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
gap index 
for 
population 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
severity 
index for 
children 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
severity 
index for 
population 
(%) 
Change in 
utility for 
school-age 
children 
(%) 
Change in 
utility for 
population 
(%) 
 
POO 17 22 -17.54 -14.15 -29.02 -23.78 -37.46 -31.40 0.6448 0.4482 
POO 15 26 -18.48 -14.65 -31.23 -25.21 -40.12 -33.13 0.6978 0.4777 
ALL 10 20 -7.59   -6.02 -13.81 -11.05 -19.03 -15.48 0.4606 0.3187 
ALL 9 26 -7.34 -5.85 -13.86 -11.15 -19.17 -15.71 0.4622 0.3222 
ALL 8 36 -7.60 -6.07 -13.88 -11.26 -19.14 -15.84 0.4674 0.3290 
RUR 11 20 -8.24 -6.52 -15.13 -12.06 -20.24 -16.43 0.5020 0.3448 
RUR 10 24 -8.29 -6.60 -14.98 -12.02 -20.17 -16.47 0.4949 0.3425 
FEM 16 18 -7.42   -5.92 -13.09 -10.35 -17.78 -14.29 0.4522 0.3095 
FEM 14 22 -7.85 -6.24 -13.61 -10.72 -18.47 -14.79 0.4683 0.3191 
FEM 11 34 -7.97 -6.29 -13.61 -10.77 -18.15 -14.59 0.4610 0.3152 
FEM 10 42 -7.89 -6.21 -13.69 -10.94 -18.25 -14.80 0.4634 0.3199 
PRO 17 30 -6.82   -5.59 -15.38 -12.80 -21.47 -18.38 0.4814 0.3432 
PRO 13 42 -7.32 -5.78 -16.74 -13.52 -23.21 -19.32 0.5156 0.3578 
PRO 7 180 -7.69 -6.13 -15.16 -12.35 -19.60 -16.26 0.4875 0.3430 
WID 17 92 -7.20 -5.31 -9.01 -7.18 -10.14 -8.51 0.4249 0.2776 
WID 15 115 -7.27 -5.13 -8.90 -6.93 -9.82 -8.04 0.4342 0.2753 
WID 14 130 -7.18 -5.05 -8.88 -6.89 -9.75 -7.92 0.4358 0.2743 
LOW 17 26 -6.92   -5.71 -14.39 -11.93 -19.53 -16.64 0.4749 0.3368 
LOW 11 48 -7.32 -5.83 -15.62 -12.53 -20.95 -17.28 0.5021 0.3462 
LOW 10 58 -7.18 -5.94 -15.77 -12.74 -21.17 -17.53 0.5056 0.3509 
Source: Authors’ calculations using CSES 2004 
Note:  Category abbreviations are described in the notes for Table 2 
Change in utility is used as a proxy for change in social welfare, computed as the sum of changes in logarithms of expenditures before and after 
the cash transfer program. This measure accounts for the diminishing returns from expenditures 
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Table 4 The most effective cash transfer programs under various conditions 
Total 
cost as % 
of GDP 
in 2004 
Category Ending 
eligible 
age 
Benefit 
level 
as % of 
poverty 
line 
 
Change in 
poverty 
headcount 
ratio for 
children 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
headcount 
ratio for 
population 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
gap index 
for 
children 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty gap 
index for 
population 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
severity 
index for 
children 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
severity 
index for 
population 
(%) 
Change in 
utility for 
school-age 
children 
(%) 
Change in 
utility for 
population 
(%) 
Per capita expenditure used to measure poverty 
0.25% POO 9 18 -5.28 -4.22 -9.8 -7.88 -13.77 -11.27 0.2158 0.1476 
 FEM 8 22 -2.67 -2.1  
 PRO 10 20 -5.38 -4.32 -8.44 -6.9 0.164 0.1132 
0.50% POO 13 16 -10.1 -8.03 -17.55 -13.97 -23.62 -19.19 0.3856 0.2608 
 RUR 10 12 -4.65  
 RUR 7 34 -3.71  
 PRO 12 26 -9.58 -7.67 -14.33 -11.77 0.2924 0.2016 
1.00% POO 15 26 -18.48 -14.65 -31.23 -25.21 -40.12 -33.13 0.6978 0.4777 
 RUR 10 24 -8.29 -6.6  
 PRO 13 42 -16.74 -13.52 -23.21 -19.32 0.5156 0.3578 
1.25% POO 16 30 -18.23  
 POO 15 32 -37.41 -30.26 -47.1 -39.02 0.8446 0.5787 
 POO 14 34 -23.16  
 RUR 14 16 -8.19  
 RUR 13 18 -10.37  
 PRO 12 60 -20.11 -16.21 -26.95 -22.45 0.6288 0.4351 
1.50% POO 16 36 -21.62 -35.02 -44.43
 POO 15 38 -43.17  -53.34 0.9868 0.6768 
 POO 13 44 -27.74  
 FEM 11 52 -12.63 -9.83  
 PRO 13 62 -22.95 -18.62 -30.05 -25.25 0.7299 0.5077 
 
23 
24 
 
Table 4 continued 
Total cost 
as % of 
GDP in 
2004 
Category Ending 
eligible 
age 
Benefit 
level 
as % of 
poverty 
line 
Change in 
poverty 
headcount 
ratio for 
children 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
headcount 
ratio for 
population 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
gap index 
for children   
(%) 
Change in 
poverty gap 
index for 
population 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
severity 
index for 
children 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
severity 
index for 
population 
(%) 
Change in 
utility for 
school-age 
children   
(%) 
Change in 
utility for 
population 
(%) 
Adult equivalent per capita expenditure  
0.25% POO 9 18 -22.72  -25.37 0.1991 0.1373 
 POO 8 24 -19.03 -17.36 -20.03
 POO 7 36 -13.61  
 PRO 10 20 -18.34 -13.5 -20.57 -15.48 0.1513 0.1053 
 PRO 7 52 -13.12 -9.52  
0.50% POO 13 16 -33.29 -24.48 -40.54 -30.55 -45.84 -35.04 0.3557 0.2425 
 PRO 17 16 -22.54 -30.91 -25.28
 PRO 13 22 -29.19  
 PRO 11 30 -21.24  0.2658 0.1846 
 PRO 10 36 -15.5  
1.00% POO 17 22 -63.37 -49.77 -69.63 -55.91
 POO 15 26  0.6436 0.4441 
 POO 13 30 -57.19 -42.79  
 PRO 17 30 -42.77 -34.27 -42.36 -35.5
 PRO 16 32 -36.81 -27.7  
 PRO 13 42  0.4755 0.3326 
1.25% POO 16 30 -49.72 -71.38 -55.73 -76.52 -60.93
 POO 15 32 -65.18  0.7789 0.538 
 PRO 17 38 -40.96 -31.64 -46.72 -37.93 -45.63 -38.72
 PRO 15 44  0.4052 
 PRO 12 60  0.5799
1.50% POO 17 34 -73.46 -55.89 -79.13 -63.01 -84.71 -69
 POO 15 38  0.9101 0.6293 
 PRO 17 46 -44.18 -34.69 -49.71 -40.75 -47.65 -40.85 0.4715 
 PRO 11 84       0.6734  
Source: Authors’ calculations using CSES 2004 
 
Table 5 Variable names, definitions, and summary statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Characteristics of children 
attend 1 if attending school, 0 otherwise 0.7734335 0.4186186 
sex 1 if female, 0 otherwise 0.4900355 0.4999113 
age Age of child 11.56887 3.341723 
age2 (age – mean_age)^2 11.16664 10.36319 
Characteristics of head 
  
 
offspring 
 
1 if child or grandchild of the head, 0 otherwise 0.964153 0.1859124 
head_age Age of the head 44.59086 10.4573 
head_age2 (head_age – mean_head_age)^2 109.3506 178.2419 
head_sex 1 if head is female, 0 otherwise 0.1683415 0.3741772 
 
hprimary 
 
1 if head’s education is up to the primary level, 0 
otherwise  
 
0.4641108 
 
0.4987208 
hpostprimary 
 
 
1 if head’s education is higher than primary level, 
0 otherwise 
 
0.2723780 
 
0.4451927 
 
hnoschooling 
 
 
1 if the head has no education, 0 otherwise 
 
 
0.2635112 
 
0.4407729 
 
h_agr 
 
1 if head’s occupation is in agriculture sector, 0 
otherwise 
 
0.6480746 
 
0.4775809 
 
h_ind 
 
1 if head’s occupation is in industry sector, 0 
otherwise 
 
0.0636717 
 
0.2441723 
 
h_ser 
 
1 if head’s occupation is in service sector, 0 
otherwise 
 
0.2421044 
 
0.4283662 
 
h_unemployed 
 
1 if the head is unemployed, 0 otherwise 
 
0.0461493 
 
0.2099041 
Characteristics of household 
sector 1 if urban, 0 if rural 0.1889461 0.3914741 
 
nchild5 
 
Number of other children whose age is 5 or 
below 
 
0.5479226 
 
0.7468101 
 
nchild17 
 
Number of other school-age children 
 
1.806198 
 
1.237025 
nadult Number of adults in the household 2.73252 1.242577 
lpcexp Logarithms of per capita expenditure 7.74329 0.7197881 
Source: Authors’ calculations using CSES 2004 
Note: The estimates do not use the sample weights, and number of observations is 23,684 
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Table 6 Marginal effects for Probit models 
Variables Overall Male 
nonpoor 
Female 
nonpoor 
Male poor Female poor 
attend      
      
sex -0.0387***     
 (0.00525)     
age -0.00838*** -0.00310*** -0.0144*** -0.00208 -0.0150*** 
 (0.000775) (0.00110) (0.00135) (0.00199) (0.00216) 
age2 -0.0136*** -0.0100*** -0.0121*** -0.0159*** -0.0186*** 
 (0.000250) (0.000358) (0.000426) (0.000638) (0.000700) 
offspring 0.138*** 0.0996*** 0.177*** 0.0686 0.140*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0290) (0.0312) (0.0443) (0.0495) 
head_age -0.000817** -8.32e-05 -0.000376 -0.00121 -0.00254*** 
 (0.000348) (0.000497) (0.000599) (0.000886) (0.000949) 
head_age2 2.66e-05 -1.04e-05 -6.58e-06 6.94e-05 0.000109** 
 (1.88e-05) (2.56e-05) (3.21e-05) (4.83e-05) (5.35e-05) 
head_sex -0.00520 -0.00317 -0.0132 0.00178 -0.00732 
 (0.00767) (0.0109) (0.0136) (0.0192) (0.0211) 
hprimary 0.0796*** 0.0626*** 0.0568*** 0.103*** 0.0995*** 
 (0.00611) (0.00941) (0.0114) (0.0143) (0.0155) 
hpostprimary 0.139*** 0.102*** 0.115*** 0.191*** 0.178*** 
 (0.00614) (0.00937) (0.0118) (0.0137) (0.0167) 
hnoschooling ref ref ref ref ref 
h_agr 0.00287 0.0114 -0.0146 0.00862 0.00127 
 (0.0137) (0.0181) (0.0228) (0.0374) (0.0402) 
h_ind 0.00797 0.00750 0.0182 0.00640 -0.00878 
 (0.0166) (0.0214) (0.0266) (0.0456) (0.0515) 
h_ser 0.0401*** 0.0494*** 0.0165 0.0344 0.0528 
 (0.0134) (0.0169) (0.0230) (0.0385) (0.0421) 
h_unemployed ref ref ref ref ref 
sector 0.0128* 0.0307*** 0.0250** -0.0376 -0.0204 
 (0.00761) (0.00948) (0.0119) (0.0233) (0.0247) 
nchild5 -0.0200*** -0.0159*** -0.0257*** -0.0101 -0.0264*** 
 (0.00376) (0.00604) (0.00690) (0.00863) (0.00955) 
nchild17 -0.00528** -0.00173 -0.00662 -0.0131** 0.00340 
 (0.00230) (0.00339) (0.00410) (0.00565) (0.00601) 
nadult 0.0129*** 0.0104*** 0.0165*** 0.0100 0.0147** 
 (0.00248) (0.00362) (0.00421) (0.00638) (0.00680) 
lpcexp 0.0803*** 0.0405*** 0.0560*** 0.122*** 0.150*** 
 (0.00516) (0.00881) (0.00983) (0.0239) (0.0246) 
      
Observations 23684 7238 6928 4840 4678 
Log likelihood -10350 -2595 -2823 -2430 -2429 
Source: Authors’ estimates using CSES 2004 
Note: The estimates do not use the sample weights  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 Selection of cash transfer programs costing approximately 1 percent 
of GDP in 2004 and their impacts on school attendance  
Category Ending 
eligible age 
Benefit level as % 
of poverty line 
Average increase in 
school attendance 
(%) 
POO 17 22 0.77 
POO 15 26 0.72 
ALL 10 20 0.29 
ALL 9 26 0.27 
ALL 8 36 0.26 
RUR 11 20 0.32 
RUR 10 24 0.31 
FEM 16 18 0.30 
FEM 14 22 0.27 
FEM 11 34 0.24 
FEM 10 42 0.24 
PRO 17 30 0.49 
PRO 13 42 0.39 
PRO 7 180 0.26 
WID 17 92 0.38 
WID 15 115 0.33 
WID 14 130 0.30 
LOW 17 26 0.48 
LOW 11 48 0.34 
LOW 10 58 0.33 
Source: Authors’ calculations using CSES 2004 
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Table 8 The most effective cash transfer programs under various 
conditions  
Total cost 
as % of 
GDP in 
2004 
Category Ending 
eligible age 
Benefit level 
as % of 
poverty line 
Increase in 
school 
attendance 
rate (%) 
0.25% POO 9 18 0.16 
 WID 17 26 0.13 
0.50% POO 13 16 0.34 
 PRO 17 16 0.28 
1.00% POO 17 22 0.77 
 PRO 17 30 0.49 
1.25% POO 17 28 0.95 
 PRO 17 38 0.61 
1.50% POO 17 34 1.13 
 PRO 17 46 0.72 
Source: Authors’ calculations using CSES 2004 
 
Figure 1 Poverty and school attendance rates by age and province 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using CSES 2004 
Notes:  The authors’ estimate of the average school attendance rate for the 10 
provinces with the lowest enrollment is 69.78%, and that for the rest is 80.02% 
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Figure 2 Estimated impacts on “Poor” school-age children as benefit level varies 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using CSES 2004 
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Figure 3 Estimated impacts on “Poor” children of a benefit equal to 50 percent of poverty line 
as the ending eligible age varies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using CSES 2004 
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